Constitutions - State and Federal, the organic Law
It is settled by numerous decisions that the intent of the
lawmaker is the law.
Runyon v. Smith, 308 Ky. 73, 212 S. W. 2d 521;
Rasmussen v. Barker, 7 Wyo. 117, 50 P 819;
U. S. v. Freeman, 3 How. 556;
U. S. v. Babbit, 1 Black 61;
Stewart v. Kahn, 2 Wall. 493.
INTENT. One's mental attitude, including purpose, will
determination, etc., at the time of doing an act.
Webster's New World Dictionary, 2nd College Ed., 1970.
ORGANIC LAW. The fundamental law, or constitution of a system
of laws or principles which defines and establishes the
organization of its government.
St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 46 S. W. 976, 42 L. R. A. 686, 68
Am. St. Rep. 575.
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th edition (1968), West Publishing Co.,
p. 1251.
"The authority of the organic law is universally acknowledged;
it speaks the sovereign will of the people; its injunction
regarding the process of legislation is as authoritative as are
those touching the substance of it."
Suth. Stat. Const., p. 44, note 1.
"The constitution of a state is the fundamental law of the
State."
Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199.
"What is a constitution? It is the form of government,
delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain
first principles of fundamental laws are established."
Van Horne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304. (Italics added.)
"Constitutional provisions and amendments to the Constitution
relate to the fundamental law and certain fixed principles upon
which governments are founded. Constitutions are commonly called
the organic law of a State."
State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S. W.
689.
"A constitution is designated as a supreme enactment, a
fundamental act of legislation by the people of the state. A
constitution is legislation direct from the people acting in
their sovereign capacity, while a statute is legislation from
their representatives, subject to limitations prescribed by the
superior authority."
Ellingham v. Dye, 231 U. S. 250.
"The basic purpose of a written constitution has a two-fold
aspect, first securing [not granting] to the people of certain
unchangeable rights and remedies, and second, the curtailment of
unrestricted governmental activity within certain defined
spheres."
Du Pont v. Du Pont, 85 A 724. (Insertion added.)
"The constitution of a state is stable and permanent, not to
be worked upon the temper of the times, not to rise and fall with
the tide of events. Notwithstanding the competition of opposing
interests, and the violence of contending parties, it remains
firm and immoveable, as a mountain amidst the strife and storms,
or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the waves."
Vanhorne v. Dorrance, supra.
"States may enforce constitutional right, but not impair
it."
In Re Perkins (1852), 2 Cal. 424.
"The provisions of the Constitution are intended effectually
and completely to protect substantial rights, and can not be
frittered away by indirect legislation."
Lux v. Haggin, (1886) 69 Cal. 256, 4 Pac. 919, 10 Pac. 674
Construction of Constitutions
"In ascertaining the meaning of the terms of the Constitution,
recurrence may be had to the principles of the common law."
United States v. Brody, 3 Cr. Law Mag. 69.
"The terms of a constitutional amendment are not controlling
in giving construction to the provisions of the Constitution as
they originally stood."
Norton v. Bradham (1884), 21 S. C. 375.
"We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of
the law as it existed at the time it was adopted."
Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 243.
"In this, as in other respects, it (a constitutional
provision) must be interpreted in the light of the common law,
the principles of history of which were familiarly known to the
framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 12 Wall. 162. .
. .The language of the Constitution, as had been well said, could
not be understood without reference to the common law. 1 Kent
Comm. 336. . . . "
Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 126.
"(I)n the construction of these instruments the following rules are actually observed:
1. The practical construction must be uniform. A constitution does not mean one thing at one time and another at some subsequent time.
2. The object of construction is to give effect to the intent of the people in establishing the Constitution; it is the intent of the law giver that is to be enforced. But the intent is to be found in the instrument itself. . . .
Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law, 3rd. ed. (1898), pp. 386-387. (Little & Brown Co.).
"The term 'citizen' was used in the Constitution as a word,
the meaning of which was already established and well
understood.
And the Constitution itself contains a direct recognition of the
subsisting common-law principle, in the section which defines the
qualifications of the President: `No person except a natural born
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of
the President,' etc . . . . The only standard which existed of a
natural born Citizen was the rule of the common law, and no
different standard has been adopted since."
Lynch v. Clarke (1844), 1 Sandf. Ch. (N.Y.) 656.
ESTABLISH. 1. To set and fix firmly or unalterably; to settle
permanently. "I will establish my covenant with him for an
everlasting covenant." Gen. xvii. 2. To found permanently; to
erect and fix or settle; as to establish a colony or empire. 3.
To enact or decree by authority and for permanence. . . 4. To
settle or fix; to confirm. . . 5. To make firm; to confirm; to
ratify what has been previously set or made. "Do we then make
void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the
law." Rom. iii.
American Dictionary of the English Language (1828), Noah Webster.
(Reprinted by the Foundation for American Christian Education,
1967)
ESTABLISH. This word occurs frequently in the Constitution of
the United States, and it is there used in different meanings:
(1) to settle firmly, to fix unalterably; as to establish
Justice, which is the avowed object of the Constitution. . . .To
settle or fix firmly; place on a permanent footing; found;
create; put beyond doubt or dispute; prove; convince. . . .
Black's Law Dictionary, supra, p. 642.
ESTABLISH. 1. to make stable; make firm; settle [to establish
a habit] 2. to order, ordain, or enact (a law, statute, etc. . .
) 3. to set up (a government, nation, business, etc. . . ).
Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, 2nd
College Edition, World Publishing Co., 1970.
"The term 'Citizen of the United States' must be understood to
mean those who were citizens of the State as such after the Union
had commenced and the several States had assumed their
sovereignty.
Before that period there were no citizens of the United
States."
Inhabitants of Manchester v. Inhabitants of Boston, 16 Mass. 230,
235.
"The perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union by no means
implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, of of the
right of self-government by the States. Under the Articles of
Confederation each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right not
expressly delegated to the United States. Under the Constitution,
though the powers of the States were much restricted, still, all
powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people
. . . . Not only, therefore, can their be no loss of separate and
independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the
Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the
preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their
governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance
of the national government. The Constitution, in all its
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States."
Texas v. White (1868), 7 Wall. (U.S.) 700.
14th Amendment citizenship Distinguished from State Citizenship
Citizenship
The below references contain statements concerning racial aspects of early America, as well as those which do not.
Do NOT presume that references to 'white' are the only available or proper 'people' as Americans. Racial bias and/or prejudices follow judges as well various members of society. That does NOT make them viable or indictive of the 'all men are equal' of the constituional contracts. Just as racism was reflected by some in society, such has occurred upon the bench; just as we see its continuation in the world today, with nationalism, supposed "patriotism", and other reflections.
For a review of historical racism see:
Racism
in America: historical implications from the bench and
elsewhere
Expose` of Crimes Volume I briefing
Expose` of Crimes Volume V submitted 04-11-04
Expose' of Crimes Volume VIII submitted 02-26-04
Office of The President 1995 - Request for Investigation into
Ohio corruption - materials
Derived from birth and race
"State Citizenship is a vested substantial property right, and
the State has no power to divest or impair these rights."
Favot v. Kingsbury, (1929) 98 Cal. App. 284, 276 P. 1083.
"For this you have every inducement of sympathy and interest.
Citizens by birth or choice, of a common country, that country
has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of AMERICAN,
which belongs to you in your national capacity, must always exalt
the just pride of patriotism, more than any appellation derived
from local discriminations. With slight shades of difference you
have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principle.
You have, in a common cause, fought, and triumphed together; the
independence and liberty you possess, are the work of joint
councils, and joint efforts--of common dangers, sufferings and
success."
George Washington, "Farewell Address", delivered September 17,
1796. (Emphasis added.)
"A Citizen of one state is a citizen of every state in the
Union."
Butler v. Farnsworth, Fed.Cas.No. 2,240 (U.S. 3d Cir., 4
Wash.C.C. 101).
"Admission on an equal footing with the original States, in
all respects whatever, involves equality of constitutional right
and power, which cannot afterwards be controlled, and it also
involves as Citizens of the United States of those whom Congress
makes members of the political community, and who are recognized
as such in the formation of the new State with the consent of
Congress."
Boyd v. Thayer (1891), 143 U.S. 143.
"The United States and the State of California are two
separate sovereignties, each dominant in its own sphere."
Redding v. Los Angeles (1947), 81 C.A.2d 888, 185 P.2d 430.
". . . there is a clear distinction between national and State
citizenship. U. S. citizenship does not entitle citizen [small
"c"] of the Privileges and Immunities of the Citizen of the State
[capital "C"]."
K. Tashiro v. Jordan (1927), 256 P. 545, 201 Cal. 239, 53 A.L.R.
1279, affirmed 49 S. Ct. 47, 278 U. S. 123, 73 L.Ed. 214, 14 C.
J. S. 2, p. 1131, note 75.
"A person may be a citizen of the United States, and not a
citizen of any particular state. This is the condition of
citizens residing in the District of Columbia and in the
territories of the United States or who have taken up a residence
abroad."
Prentiss v. Brennan (1845?), Fed.Cas.No. 11,385, 2 Blatchf.
162.
Many people and organizations claim areas identified by ZIP codes are territories of the United States. This is NOT true. Though some courts and agnecies attempt to claim this, or assume such is fact, there is no support for such, by Law and constitutions.
"The government of the United States is a foreign corporation
with respect to a state."
In re Merriam, 36 N. E. 505, 141 N. Y. 479, affirmed 16 S. Ct.
1073, 163 U. S. 625, 41 L.Ed. 287.
"Under constitutional amendment 14, United States citizenship
is paramount and dominant, and not subordinate and derivative
from State Citizenship."
Aroer v. United States, 245 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L.Ed.
349.
"Aliens are commonly understood as persons who owe allegiance
to a foreign government."
De Cano v. State, 110 P.2d 627, 631 and the 1943 Government Code
242 (from Political Code 57).
"Citizens of the District of Columbia are not Citizens of a
state."
Behlert v. James Foundation of N. Y., 60 F.Supp. 706, 708.
"A corporation aggregate is not considered as a [de jure
State] citizen or entitled to the privileges of [de jure State]
citizenship, except for the purpose of giving jurisdiction, for
which a corporation may be considered a citizen of the State by
which it is incorporated."
Bank of United States v. Deveaux (1809), 5 Cranch (9 U. S.) 61;
Ducat v. City of Chicago (1870), 10 Wall. 410, 19 L.Ed. 972.
(Insertion added.)
"Corporations are not [de jure State] Citizens under Article
IV section 2 of the Constitution of the United States."
Paul v. Virginia (1868), 8 Wall. 168, 19 L.Ed. 357.
"A citizen of the United States is ipso facto and at the same
time a citizen of the state in which he resides. While the 14th
Amendment does not create a national citizenship, it has the
effect of making that citizenship 'paramount and dominant'
instead of 'derivative and dependent' upon state
citizenship."
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 427.
"Upon that ground, appeals to this court to extend the clause
beyond the limitation have been uniformly rejected, and even
those basic privileges and immunities secured against federal
infringement by the first eight amendments have been uniformly
been held not to be protected from state actions by the
privileges and immunities clause. . . .The reason for this narrow
construction of clause and the consistently exhibited reluctance
of this court to enlarge its scope has been well understood since
the decision of the Slaughter House Cases. If its restraint upon
state action were to be extended more than is needful to protect
relationships between the citizen and the national government,
and if it were to be deemed to extend to those fundamental rights
of person and property attached to citizenship by the common law
and enactments of the states when the amendment was adopted, such
as were described in Corfield v. Coryell, supra, it would enlarge
Congressional and judicial control of state action and multiply
restrictions upon it whose nature, thought difficult to
anticipate with precision, would be of sufficient gravity to
cause serious apprehension for the rightful independence of local
government.
That was the issue fought out in the Slaughter House Cases,
with the decision against enlargement. Ibid., pp. 520-521, note
1.
"The observation of the court in United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U. S. 542, 551, that the right of assembly was not secured
against state action by the Constitution, must be attributed to
the decision in the Slaughter House Cases that only privileges
and immunities peculiar to United States citizenship were secured
by the privileges and immunities clause, and to the further fact
that at that time it had not been decided that the right was one
protected by the due process clause. Ibid., p. 526.
"But the court added that with respect to the 14th Amendment
"there are certain privileges and immunities which belong to a
citizen of the United States as such; otherwise it would be
nonsense for the 14th Amendment to prohibit a state from
abridging them. . . .We agree. . . that there are privileges and
immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, and that
it is these and these alone which a state is forbidden to
abridge." The governments of the United States and of the each of
the several states are distinct from one another. The rights of a
citizen under one may be quite different from those which he has
under the other."
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 429.
"The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, which are protected by the 14th Amendment, against
abridgement by the states, are those which arise out of the
essential nature and characteristics of the national government,
the federal Constitution, treaties, or acts of Congress, as
distinguished from those belonging to the Citizens of a state;. .
. . "
Gardner v. Ray, 157 S. W. 1147, 1150; Hammer v. State, 89 N. E.
850, 851, 173 Ind. 199, 24 L. R. A., N. S., 795, 140 Am. St. Rep.
248, 21 Ann. Cas. 1034.
"This part of the opinion, then, concludes with the holding
that the rights relied upon in the case are those which belong to
the citizens of the states as such and are under the sole care
and protection of the state governments. The conclusion is
preceded by the important declaration that the civil rights
theretofore appertaining to citizenship of the states, were not
given the security of national protection by this class of the
14th Amendment. "
Twining v. New Jersey, supra, p. 94.
If you have read the above and the Expose` Volumes, you should have ascertained that there are, clearly, two distinct classes of 'c'/'C'itzens, state and federal. The 14th Amendment only applies towards those it protects, citizens claimed by United States [congress assembled, territorial limited]. Presently those are 'blacks' (excuse that term please), women, and naturalized citizen/subjects [first generation immi'grants' (granted allowance)].
The postal aspect, the 14th Amendment, the 'voting benefits extended', and other Acts of congress do NOT effect or affect state Citizens, as there is no "jurisdiction" for them to do so. Therefore, all attempts to assign United States citizen/subject class status on people of the states, are in fraud of constitutional Law, dolus dans causum contractui.